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Wow. I hadn’t thought of it through a historical perspective.
(John Grisham, The Partner [1997])
In the past 20 years, dedicated research efforts have helped us expand
our knowledge of how the international financial system operates. Be-
cause the emergence of global finance is really a reemergence, much of
this research has been devoted to understanding previous regimes and
experiences in relation to modern ones. Although matters are hardly
settled and controversy is vibrant, there is at least now a body of litera-
ture to which we can turn. We know much more about the record of in-
ternationaldebtthanwedid30yearsago.Inparticular,wehaveacquired
knowledge on how previous bondholders have fared (Eichengreen and
Portes 1986; Lindert and Morton 1989); the incidence of collective action
institutions on recovery rates (Eichengreen and Portes 1989); debt crises
and the volatility of bond prices (Bordo et al. 2001; Mauro, Sussman, and
Yafeh 2006);contagioninthe longrun;
1and thefactors thataffect acoun-
try’s reputation (Flandreau 2003; Tomz 2007).
2 We have also acquired
knowledge on the historical determinants of sovereign bond prices in
secondarymarkets
3andonthehistoricaleffectsofexchangerateregimes
on credibility (or lack thereof).
4 Finally, we have acquired statistical
knowledge on the long‐run evolution of government debt.
5
One area has been relatively underresearched: the microeconomics of
foreign currency sovereign debt issuance. Macroeconomists recognize
that the workings of primary international capital markets are important
because these markets provide countries with access to external fund-
ing.
6 Yet the nuts and bolts of their operation are usually neglected, save
the occasional outburst of interest in a special feature of possible rele-
vance to policy. A prominent example is earlier research on the causes
and consequences of the “original sin” phenomenon.
7 The relevance of
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978‐0‐226‐70749‐5/2010/2009‐0020$10.00some more arcane aspects of debt issuance has also been acknowledged;
wehaveinmindstudiesontheeffectofcertaincovenants (e.g.,collective
action clauses) on bond prices.
8
This paper is the first to take up the issue of the operation of primary
markets over the long run. We identify an intriguing result. Using new
data on several episodes of foreign currency sovereign debt issues in
leading capital markets and then arranging the output by underwriter,
wefind thatdefaultsare today randomlydistributedacross underwriters.
Buttheywerenotrandomlydistributedinthepast,andthisiswhatwecall
the default puzzle.
Resolving the default puzzle requires that we discuss insights from
banking theory. Our interpretation hinges on the effects of “brand” or
“charter” value on intermediaries’ risk taking. In the past era (by which
we mean the long‐run period that began in the early nineteenth century
and ended with the interwarcrisis), underwriters provided valuable cer-
tification services. They tried to secure prestige by convincing investors
that their name was associated with safer products. They did this not for
the sake of honesty, altruism, or self‐esteem but rather because doing so
entailed benefits. Today is different: underwriters have shed their role as
certifiers and have outsourced it to rating agencies. The resulting reduc-
tioninliabilityriskalsomeansthatmorecompetitivebanksareprepared
to issue riskier securities. We suggest that this new situation has given
birth to a market for lemons, a market that did not exist in the past. We
concludethatthenextsovereigndebttsunamiwillcrashonaforeigncur-
r e n c yd e b tm a r k e tt h a ti sby design more accident prone than its pre-
decessors. Whether we will have adequate tools to handle the disaster
remains to be seen.
In support of these claims we marshal a large amount of new data. In
contrast to many important and ambitious previous works, we draw not
only on published sources but on archives as well, and we have also per-
formed interviews. This reliance on primary evidence (archives and in-
terviews)isessentialgiventhesometimessecretivenatureofthebusiness
under study. As a result, this paper is the first to deal with the operation
of primary markets for foreign government debt over such a long time
span. With the help of this new evidence, we are able to test our central
argumentthrougha numberof itsimplications. Among our findings, we
report a change in the degree of concentration in the underwriting busi-
ness (highly concentrated in the past, much less so now), in the under-
writing services provided(encompassing in the past, much morelimited
now), on the fees collected (large and increasing with risks in the past,
small and unresponsive to bond spreads now), on the quality standards
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 54appliedbymarketleaders(highinthepast,lownow),onthecooperation
between underwriters and borrowers (strong in the past, limited today),
and finally on the quality outlook of the products brought to the market
(the past did not have a large market for products below the investment
grade threshold, the present does).
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the
data, the default puzzle, and a sketch of the argument; the rest of the
sectionsprovidevarioustestsofourtheory.SectionIIdiscussesmeasures
of market concentration. Section III provides evidence on underwriting
patternsandfeeslevied.SectionIVdiscussestherelationbetweenunder-
writers’ brand value and risk taking. Section V provides evidence on the
link between underwriting and contagion, and Section VI explores the
link between banker turnover and reputation. Section VII shows that
the modern period has been characterized by the emergence of riskier
debt, and Section VIII discusses the reasons for the regime change in
the modern era. We end with conclusions in Section IX.
I. The Default Puzzle
A. Background and Data
In the nineteenth century, lending to foreign governments occurred
through the agency of originating houses located in the leading financial
markets of the time. Because these houses had subsidiaries or partners in
various cities, the diffuse nature of origination was a characteristic fea-
tureof the business. London was the leader in that it was home to a large
number of underwriters and issues, but Paris emerged as a serious com-
petitor in the late nineteenth century.
9 During the interwar period, the
centerof theworldfinancialsystemshiftedpartlyto NewYork,andgov-
ernment securities followed.
10 After an extended period of suspension—
coinciding with the period between the interwar bonded debt collapse
and the banking debt debacle of the early 1980s—the loan origination
market has been reinvented along lines that seem to be broadly similar.
11
This prospering modern market relies on international securities origi-
natedand distributedbyinvestmentbanks.Theemergingmarketscrises
of the 1990s and their boom during the period 2002–7 have been its latest
vicissitudes. An open question at the time we are writing is the resilience
of foreign country debt in the wake of the subprime crisis, global reces-
sion, and high credit default swap (CDS) premia.
In this paper we examine foreign government debt issued in leading
financial centers in the past 200 years. Our database comprises issues
The End of Gatekeeping 55of foreign governments’ debts since the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury. We look at the markets in London (1818–1914), Paris (1882–1914),
and New York (1920–30). We also look at the foreign government debt
of “emerging” and “transition” countries that has been placed abroad
during the present era (i.e., 1993–2007). Our data are not a series of sam-
ples but rather, as far as possible, the documented population of issues.
12
The historical material is constructed from listings of securities issued in
the relevant markets and checked againstlistsfound in bank archivesand
periodicals. The modern material includes the population of issues that
form the background for the league tables published by Bloomberg.
13
One issue thatarises isthecomparabilityofemergingandtransitiongov-
ernments over time. Previous research has generally brushed this is-
sue aside, considering nineteenth‐century borrowers such as Denmark,
Sweden, or Canada to be suitable counterparts to modern emerging coun-
tries.
14 Such an assumption may well be questioned (Accominotti et al.
2010). Because colonies were actually subsovereign entities, they have been
excluded from this study. We focus on sovereign borrowing by emerging
andtransitioncountriesnowandonsovereignborrowinginforeigncurrency
then. On the other hand, strict comparability would likely have required
us to add countries that are more well behaved to the modern data set.
Our logic is market based, not fundamentals based (the latter would be
quiteimpossibletoimplement).Inotherwords,wecomparemarketswith
each other. First of all, to the extent that producers of league tables and
marketparticipantsdescribethedebtofemergingandtransitioncountries
as forming a market, it is natural to try to match it against historical coun-
terparts.Previousperiodsdidnotrecognizesuchdifferencesandlookedat
the foreign currency government bond markets as a whole; in fact, those
markets did contain predominantly the securities of countries without a
large domestic market. Second, we noted a fair amount of continuity in
the identity of the countries involved in various episodes (Russia in the
nineteenth century and today is an example that comes to mind). Finally,
we strongly believe that our basic findings would be robust to the inclu-
sion in the modern group of safer borrowers, because our key point is
about transformations in the high‐risk group, not in the low‐risk group.
The chronology that we identify does capture the six successive waves
of sovereign debt issues that have taken place since the 1820s. Historians
have shown that the first five waves were terminated in more or less
abrupt ways: those in the early nineteenth century (1818–29), the mid‐
nineteenth century (1845–76), the 1880s (1877–95), the pre–World War I
period(sometimesinappropriatelycalledthe“firsteraofglobalization”),
the 1920s (1920–30), and finally the modern era (1993–2007). Three of
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riod) were terminated by massive failures, so they will receive more
detailed attention. In the rest of the paper these periods will be referred
to either in terms of the time spans just described or in shorthand as (re-
spectively) “early nineteenth,”“ mid‐nineteenth,”“ 1880s,”“ pre–World
War I,”“ interwar,” and “now.”
B. The Puzzle
Defaulting countries are usually studied from the point of view of their
characteristics or fundamentals, and accordingly an exciting literature
has sought to relate default probabilities to countries’ performance.
15
Previous authors identified defaulting patterns and coined the expres-
sion “serial defaulters” to designate recidivists (Reinhart and Rogoff
2004).Herewesuggesttakingadifferentlook.Webringanewdimension
to the study and suggest examining defaults on the basis of underwriter
identity. The importance of common lenders has been recognized in pre-
vious studies of contagion, which emphasized commonality of lending
c e n t e r sa sap o s s i b l ep r o p a g a t i o nm e c h a n i s m .W eb r i n gt h et o p i ct oa
finerlevelandexploretherelationbetweenborrowersandunderwriters.
16
Our first question is to ask whether defaults across underwriters can be
described as being generated from a random draw or whether, instead,
underwriters do (or did) specialize in certain kinds of securities.
17
For this purpose we compare the distribution of defaults per under-
writer during the modern era and earlier periods. A formal criterion that
is chi‐square based is Cramér’s V statistic (Kendall and Stuart 1979). We
computed this statistic for three selected episodes of major sovereign
debt distress (the 1820s, 1870s, and 1920s) as well as for today;
18 the out-
putispresentedinfigure1.Weseethatformerlytherewasaclusteringof
defaults about certain intermediaries (in the past, defaults were not ran-
dom) but that this is no longer true today (defaults are now randomly
distributed).
19 This intriguing result means that the identity of under-
writers once provided information on the likelihood of future defaults
but no longer does so. This is the default puzzle.
C. Suggested Resolution
Canwema kesenseofthispuzzle?Thear gumentweputforwar dbuildson
theoretical insights from banking and finance theory but also extends ideas
first articulated in Flandreau and Flores (2009). The argument has parallels
to the classic paper by Diamond (1989) on the importance of repeat play in
The End of Gatekeeping 57sustaining credibility. Because repeat play alone cannot sustain sovereign
debt, Flandreau and Flores additionally incorporate underwriters’ mono-
poly power. The intuition is related to that in the paper by Chemmanur
and Fulghieri (1994), who develop a relevant model in which the financial
intermediary’s reputation for veracity mitigates the moral hazard problem
ininformationproduction.Prestigiousunderwriterswhomightbetempted
to overprice securities in order to generate short‐term gains do not actually
do so because it would damage their reputation. Carter, Dark, and Singh
(1998) show that, over the long run, issues managed by prestigious
houses outperform those managed by ordinary ones. Also, Beatty and
Ritter (1986) show that underwriters whose offerings underperform lose
market share. Market share is the endogenous solution to precommit-
ment and credibility problems. As a result, natural monopoly emerges
as a separating equilibrium in which quality, commitment, and perfor-
mance are related to one another.
Toseehowtheseinsightsprovideawaytothinkaboutthedefaultpuz-
zle, compare two regimesin which there are both informedagents(inter-
mediaries) and uninformed agents (investors). In the first regime, which
we argue coincides with earlier times, informed underwriters combine
liquidity provision (they help with the issue of bonds) and signaling
services. In contrast, the functions of providing liquidity and signaling
quality are separated in the second regime, where underwriters concen-
trate on issuing as many bonds as they can. Certification has been dele-
gated to rating agencies that provide advice to investors.
Fig. 1. Cramér’s V: are defaults randomly distributed across underwriters? Source:
Authors’ computations.
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two regimes. The first regime provides an opportunity for certain under-
writing banks to invest in prestige. Securing a reputation as a serious un-
derwriter can become a source of rents because higher‐quality securities
have a broader market, and this fact can be used to attract the best bor-
rowers and retain an initial monopoly position. We thus expect that
such a regime will exhibit monopoly power, strong relationships be-
tween top underwriters and issuers, cherry‐p i c k i n gb yt h eb e s tu n d e r -
writers, and a tendency for lower‐grade securities to have difficulty
finding a market. The reason is that the market for speculative bonds
is operated by those underwriters with the least ability to certify (the
lemons problem).
In the second regime, certification from other than underwriters does
reducepotentialinformationalrentsforunderwriters.Ifeveryoneknows
the “true worth” of a security, then the marginal benefit of additional
signals declines. Hence we expect financial intermediaries to compete
more aggressively and underwriters to make more indiscriminate
choices when picking securities. The portfolio of securities that hits
the ground is thus of lower average quality than under the first regime.
In sum, if certification has been outsourced, then underwriters escape
liability risks. Investors are now advised of the risks and are encour-
a g e dt od i v e r s i f yi ta w a y .T h er e s u l ti st h ee m e r g e n c eo fa“market for
lemons.”
II. Market Power
Our view that earlier regimes rested on underwriter‐based certification
implies that we ought to observe more market power in earlier periods.
In table 1, we organize some hard evidence regarding the degree of com-
petition that prevailed during successive episodes. Working with the
sources described in appendix A, we constructed two statistical measures
ofmarketpower .ThefirstmeasurewediscussistheHerfindahl‐Hirschman
(H‐H) index. Recall that an index value below 1,000 is associated with an
unconcentrated market. Values between 1,000 and 1,800 characterize a
moderately concentrated market, and values above 1,800 indicate that
t h em a r k e ti sh i g h l yc o n c e n t r a t e d .T h es e c o n dm e a s u r ei st h em a r k e t
share of the top three underwriters.
Table 1 shows that the H‐H index fluctuated over time but that the
overall degree of concentration was typically higher during earlier
periods. The highest degrees of concentration were in the mid‐nineteenth,
interwar, and late nineteenth‐century Paris market (close to or above
The End of Gatekeeping 591,800).Therewasalsofairlyhighconcentration(H‐Hindexof1,667)inthe
early period(1820s). Concentrationfor the 1880s and pre–World War I pe-
riod was more moderate (values of 1,200 and1,270,respectively).The low-
e s td e g r e eo fc o n c e n t r a t i o ni so b tained for the modern period (New
York and London), for which indices are slightly above or below 1,000
and have an aggregate concentration of only 842.
Aftercomputing market shares for the top three underwriters, we find
that they always controlled more than 50% of the market in historical
time periods; the proportion is now below 50%. Peaks correspond to
the early nineteenth century (London), late nineteenth century (Paris),
and interwar period (New York), which are all above 65%. The low
ebb is observed for New York and London today (48% and 38%, respec-
tively). Again, market power is substantially lower today.
Table 1










1818–25 12 2,432 73.4 Rothschild
B. A. Goldschmidt
Thomas Wilson
1845–76 45 1,382 55.3 Rothschild
Barings
Imperial Ottoman Bank
1877–95 34 2,176 65.5 Rothschild
Barings
Hambros
1895–1913: London 33 1,196 51.7 Rothschild
Hong Kong Bank
Barings
1895–1914: Paris 14 1,746 65.0 Rothschild
BPPB
Banque Impériale Ottomane
1920–30: New York 20 2,869 68.9 JP Morgan
National City
Blair
1993–2007: New York 29 1,145 48.0 JP Morgan
Citi
Morgan Stanley
1993–2007: London 26 876 38.6 JP Morgan
UBS
Deutsche Bank
1993–2007: All 43 842 39.4 JP Morgan
Citi
Deutsche Bank
Source: See app. A.
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episodes. Striking features are the decline over time of the leader’s share
and the reduced difference now between the leader and its immediate
followers. In the 1820s, Rothschild had 40.8% of the amounts loaned in
London and the next intermediary (B. A. Goldschmidt) had 23.6%. Dur-
ing the interwar period, JP Morgan held 50.8% of the New York market
whereas the next best (National City) had 9.9%. JP Morgan still leads the
New York market, but only with 20.8%, and the next best (Citi) is close
behind with 15%. We conclude the market for underwriting foreign
government debts was highly concentrated until the interwar period,
but it has become much more competitive as of late.
III. Good Girls Go to Heaven, Bad Girls Go Everywhere
We now examine two more predictions of our theory. First, if prestigious
underwriters formerly worried about retaining market share but do
not today, then we should observe that they used to cherry‐pick better
securitiesandaremuchlessdiscriminatingtoday.Evidenceofthisispro-
vided in figures 3a and 3b. The figures compare the ex ante quality of
the portfolio of securities underwritten by the leading intermediary with
theportfoliooftheotherfirms.Here“quality”ismeasuredintermsofthe
distribution of spreads (evidence from ratings, when they are available,
provides similar results). A noticeable difference between figure 3a and
figure 3b is that the interwar leader specialized in higher‐quality securi-
ties whereas the modern leader tends to issue securities of similar or
lower quality than followers. Figure 4 provides evidence of the average
yield brought out by the “best and the rest” in a number of time periods.
The figure shows that, until the interwar period, the best always issued
safer securities than the rest.
Theothertestweconsiderlooksatexpostresults.Supposethatserious
underwriters make careful choices to protect market shares. We should
expect problems (measured here by default events) to be concentrated
within the lower end of the underwriter spectrum: less prestigious
houses, which are also the ones with the smallestmarketshares.
20 Acon-
venient tool to capture this intuition is to construct Lorenz curves of un-
derwriters’ performance. Ranking intermediaries’ market shares from
the smallest(low prestige) to the largest (high prestige) and then plotting
the cumulated share of underwriters’ securities in default (as a per-
centage of the total amount in default) help explicate the risk taking of
underwriters. To see this, we use ðxk;dkÞ to define the pair formed by the
amount underwritten by bank k (xk) and the defaulted amount previously
The End of Gatekeeping 61Fig. 2. Rankingof top 10 underwriters by market share (percentage): a,18 1 8 –29; b, 1845–76;
c, 1877–95; d, 1920–30; e, New York, 1993–2007 . Sources: Authors‘ computations from own database; see appendix A.underwritten by bank k (dk). Indices k a r eo r d e r e db yt h ea m o u n to f
banks’ underwriting:
x1 <    < xk <    < xn: ð1Þ
Fig. 2 (continued). Ranking of top 10 underwriters by market share (percentage):
d, 1920–30; e, New York, 1993–2007. Sources: Authors‘ computations from own database;
see appendix A.
The End of Gatekeeping 63Fig. 3. Spreads at issue: market leader versus the rest: a, New York, interwar period;
b, New York, modern era. Sources: Authors‘ computations from own database; see















the pairs (Xk, Dk).
Suppose that underwriters do not worry about what happens to the
securities they have sold. Then default is random: the smallest under-
writer with (say) 5% of the securities underwritten will have about 5%
of the defaults; when combined with the next‐larger underwriter who
has (say) 10% of the market, this will account for about 15% of the de-
faults, and so on. The resulting Lorenz curve should therefore be close
to the 45° line. Now suppose that prestige does confer a larger market
share but also requires placing only good securities (otherwise pres-
tige will be lost). In this case, the smallest (least prestigious) under-
writerwith5%ofthesecuritiesunderwrittenwillhavemuchmorethan
5% of the defaults (say 20%). In contrast, the largest (most prestigious)
underwriter with (say) 20% of the securities underwritten may have
Fig. 4. Risk taking: average spreads in basis points for the best and the rest. Sources:
Authors’ computations from own database; see appendix A.
The End of Gatekeeping 65only 5% of the defaults. The resulting Lorenz curve should therefore be
concave.
To test for these possibilities, we consider four episodes (fig. 5). As
before, the “past” is represented by the three most violent historical
debt crises in history (1820s, 1844–75, and 1920–30). In comparing these
episodes with the modern period, we find that the former are asso-
ciated with strongly concave Lorenz curves. This contrasts with the
modern period, in which the Lorenz curve essentially overlaps with
the 45° line. This is consistent with our view that default was not ran-
domly distributed in the past because underwriters formerly made
careful choices.
IV. Fees and Risk Taking
That underwriters were more heavily involved in the past than they are
today should imply that, other things being equal, they took on more
risks and required substantially larger fees than is now the case. To show
this, we first summarize qualitative evidence obtained from our study of
Fig. 5. Lorenz curves: three debt crises (1820s, 1840s–70s, 1920s) versus today. The
straight line (diagonal) is the 45° line. Sources: Authors’ database; see appendix A.
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marketparticipants;wethenprovidenewdataonthelong‐runevolution
of underwriting fees.
A. Underwriting Contracts, Past and Present
Today, a key aspect of any international bond issue is the “agreement”
betweenthemainunderwriterandthegovernment.Thisdocumentspec-
ifies the particulars of the issue, such as the bond structure. One central
aspectoftheagreementisthe“distributionsystem.”Inprinciple,distribu-
tion could take the form of either “best efforts” or “firm commitment”—
two forms that are known in other segments of the capital market. Under
best efforts, the intermediary pledges to help in the sale of bonds but does
notbinditselftoacquiringanyiftherearenootherbuyers.Thatis,afailed
issue creates no liability. By contrast, in a “firm commitment” arrange-
ment, the financial intermediary agrees to purchase all securities directly
fromtheissuerforsaletothe publicandisliable foranyunsoldinventory.
Interviews with market participants suggested that “best efforts” is the
ruling pattern today.
21
In the past, the contract signed between governments and under-
writers was also a central part of the process. We have examined many
such contracts. As today, the main choice was using the underwriter
either as merely distributor of the bond or rather also as full insurer of
the issue’ssuccess. Theformerarrangementwasknown as “saleon com-
mission” and the second as “firm taking.” These are equivalent to the
modern systems of best efforts and firm commitment: with sale on com-




the public. Mixed arrangements involved partial commitment with a
portion sold on commission.
23
The contracts that we examined indicate that firm taking became the
dominant pattern over the nineteenth century, although there were pe-
riods and countries for which a greater proportion ofsales oncommission
can be observed. It is fair to say that, by the end of the nineteenth century,
full or quasi‐full underwriting had become the nearly absolute norm.
However, there were still some exceptions. We found that Barings ini-
tially favored sales on commission. Testifying in 1875, one Barings em-
ployee drew a sharp contrast between issues for which they acted as
genuine “contractors” (fully underwriting the issue) and issues for which
theywouldbemere“agents”(onlyplacingtheloaninthemarket),adding
The End of Gatekeeping 67that “most generally loans are issued by the firm [i.e., Barings] in London
as agents for the Government” (Great Britain. House of Commons 1875, 1;
our italics).
24 This declaration is consistent with the actual Barings con-
tracts that we could inspect. Yet over time, even Barings moved to full
underwriting.
Thesamepattern(i.e.,predominanceofthefullunderwritingcontract)
also prevailed during the interwar period. The Senate Committee hear-
ingsprovidemuchevidencethatthiswasthecaseintheNewYorkmarket,
and British bankers examined before the Macmillan Committee in 1931
also emphasized this fact. Sir Kindersley (of Lazard) made a distinction
between a “bank” or mere distributing institution andan “issuing house”
orgenuineoriginatorandunderwriter,andheemphasizedtheimportance
ofactuallybuyingthesecuritiesitdistributed.“Q.1302.Doyoubuyupthe
issue yourselves?—Yes. I think that another difference between an is-
suing house and a bank is that an issuing house, not always, but I think
inthemajorityofcasespurchasesthesecurityandre‐sellsittothepublic.Ittakes
the definite risk and purchases it. … This is what generally happens” (Great
Britain. Committee on Finance and Industry 1931, 77–78; our italics).
To use the language of Kindersley, modern intermediaries are more
like “banks” than “issuing houses.” The prevalence of a more coercive
business norm in the past is further supportive evidence of our central
claim.
B. Fees and Risk Taking
Can we provide some numbers that support our suggestions based on
qualitative evidence? Table 2 gives ranges for fees; sources (archival or
other) are indicated in the table note. Columns 1 and 2 report data on
fees and spreads within the subsample of securities for which we do
have material. The ratio of fee to spread is computed for the domi-
nant underwriting pattern (best eff o r t sf o rt h em o d e r np e r i o da n df u l l
underwriting for earlier times). The table supports the notions that
emerged from our previous discussion. The fee/spread ratio was much
higher in the past. It has declined significantly in recent periods, which
is consistent with our finding of a more limited underwriting service
today.
One may worry that part of the result is driven by technological prog-
ressthatmakesmodernunderwritingmoreefficient,butweareskeptical
of this objection. Most of the revenues from underwriting must come
from the risks involved (captured by underlying volatility), which we
control by using division by spreads. But to address this concern, table 2
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 68also decomposes the available evidence to report minimum, maximum,
and average fees according to alternative underwriting regimes.
25 We
find that earlier times’ best‐efforts fees were not much different from
modernones(theyweresomewhatlargeronaveragebutdidnotfallout-
side the modern range). This leads us to conclude that technological
progress cannot account for the decline in fees. Instead, we explain it
by the reduced scope of current underwriting services. The real transfor-
mation is the changeover from one business norm to another.
Further evidence on the matter can be garnered by looking at the cor-
relation between spreads and fees. Recall that, under firm commitment,
the intermediary assumes all the risk of the issue, and this risk is related
to the bond’s volatility.
26 We should thus expect a stronger association
between spreads and fees in the past than now.




squares regression of fees on spreads, plus a constant. We find higher
levels of significance and sensitivity, as well as higher R‐squared values,
in the past. This is consistent with a greater passthrough of country risk
into underwriting fees and, once again, indicates that today’s financial
intermediaries take fewer risks.
Table 2
The Evolution of Underwriting Fees in the Very Long Run






















1818–29: London 8.3 2.8 3.6 16.1 8.3 1 5.2 3.7
1845–76: London 6.1 1.9 1.5 13.1 6.1 1 2 1.8
1877–95: London 4.4 1.7 1.3 12.4 4.4 .3 3 1.83
1896–1914: London 4.9 2.7 1.0 8.2 4.9 1 2.75 2.18
1896–1914: Paris 4.1 3.8 1.6 9.1 4.1 1 2 1.56
1920–30: NYSE 5.0 1.7 1.1 15.2 5.0 NA NA NA
1993–2007: NYSE .54 .15 NA NA NA .02 2.75 .54
1993–2007: London .76 .26 NA NA NA .04 3 .76
1993–2007: All .84 .25 NA NA NA .02 3.37 .84
Source: Authors’ computations. Fees: Great Britain. House of Commons (1875), Oficina
Central de Estadísticas (1927), U.S. Congress (1932), Gille (1973), Amaral (1984), Ziegler
(1988), Dawson (1990), Dritsas (1993), Suzuki (1994), and Flores (2004). Archives: Rothschild
Archives, ING Baring Archives, HSBC Archives, Crédit Lyonnais Archive, and Guildhall
Library.Spreadatissuefromsourcesdescribedinapp.A.Benchmarkrisk‐freerates:London,
NBER macro database (before 1870) and Klovland (1994) after 1870; Paris: Vaslin (1999);
New York interwar, Wall Street Journal. Modern period: Dealogic.
aMain issuing system.
The End of Gatekeeping 69V. The Evolution of Contagion
Another implication of our analysis is that, because their reputation is at
stake, serious underwriters should take special care to ensure that their
sponsoredissuesturnoutwell.Inotherwords,theconcavityoftheLorenz
curve discussed earlier is a primary concern for them. There are various
ways to test for this hypothesis. One way is to look at whether banks
are involved in secondary markets. Brand‐conscious underwriters ought
toworryaboutexcessvolatilityorcontagionspillingoverto“their”securi-
ties. Accordingly, they should intervene to prevent such events.
Interviews with modern bankers suggested that underwriters today
offer some partial participation in the secondary market. However, the
underwriter is typically not obliged to make a secondary market for
the bonds, which is consistent with best‐efforts contracts.
28 Underwriter
responsibilityisthuslimitedtoplacingthebondsinthemarketandmak-
ing an effort to stabilize their price in the secondary market for an un-
specified duration. The underwriter is never expected to act as “lender
of last resort” on the bonds issued by governments.
29
Inpreviouseras,underwritersfrequentlyengagedinmarketoperations
to support the government bonds they were issuing, and these purchases
Table 3
Fees and Spreads (Firm Taking)




1818–29: London NA NA NA
1845–76: London .56 Fee = 3.421 + .65 × spread Accept
(3.17) (2.75)
1877–95: London .43 Fee = –1.843 + 2.492 × spread Accept
(−1.1) (4.0)
1896–1913: London .41 Fee = 1.9535 + 1.479 × spread Accept
(3.1) (5.0)
1896–1913: Paris .65 Fee = 1.658 + 1.513 × spread Accept
(8.53) (5.85)
1920–30: NYSE .32 Fee = .62475 + 1.497 × spread Accept
(1.00) (7.24)
1993–2007: NYSE .0002 Fee = .55642 + .004 × spread Reject
(10.56) (.27)
1993–2007: London .027 Fee = .59129 + .052 × spread Accept
(7.5) (2.2)
1993–2007: All .003 Fee = .8014 + .017 × spread Reject
(12.6) (1.29)
Source: Same as in table 2.
Note: Spreads and fees are in percent.
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 70wentfarbeyondtheinitialissueandplacementofthebonds.Suchopera-
tions occasionally came up in the press or in parliamentary commissions
in reference to “fictitious” operations to “inflate” bond prices, which did
occur in some cases.
30 As a result, bankers often denied that they were
involved in such schemes,
31 although leading houses acknowledged
their role as lender of last resort. Rothschild’s testimony before the Select
Committee is an example (Great Britain. House of Commons 1875, 267).
Flandreau and Flores (2009) report evidence of massive purchases of
Rothschild‐sponsored securities during one episode of financial conta-
gion in the 1820s. Kahn (from the firm Kuhn and Loeb) gave testimony
before the Senate Committee in 1931 that acknowledged the existence of
supportpurchasesandaddedthatunderwriterswereunder“permanent
moral liability” to make ends meet. As he stated, “we have frequently
made it our business, a contingent part of our obligation, that if there is
an undue or unjustifiable declinein bonds, if thereis not a fair market for
t h eb o n d s ,w eh a v em o r et h a no n c eg o n ei n t ot h em a r k e ti no r d e rt o
afford the opportunity to such people as may want to sell, or are com-
pelled to sell, within the limits of proper prudence, and within the limit
of our ability, for them to do so” (U.S. Congress 1932, 135).
Table4reportsdatathatbearonthisissue.Namely,wehaveorganized
figures on past and present markets in terms of monthly bond spreads in
sterlingbonds(1820s)andU.S.dollarbonds(now).Tofacilitatecompari-




today and that contagion is comparable. The next stage is to sort out
securities issued by the underwriter with the largest market share. That
is,weisolateRothschildsecuritiesandJPMorgansecuritiesfromtherest.
While Rothschild specialized on a more limited number of countries
( A u s t r i a ,B r a z i l ,N a p l e s ,a n dR u s s i a ) ,J PM o r g a ni su n d e r w r i t i n ga l l
governments in the sample. In other words, there is no such thing as “a
JP Morgan security” or, to put it differently, the JP Morgan portfolio is
essentially the market portfolio. The “non‐Rothschild” and “Rothschild”
columns drive our story home by showing that all the contagion did
cluster around non‐Rothschild securities. This we interpret as the com-
bined effect of (a) the signaling of good securities by prestigious under-
writers and (b) an underwriter’s willingness to intervene in support
of “its” securities (to prevent a decline in its reputation). We conclude
that good intermediaries were concerned about the performance of any
security they sponsored, and this explains why they were willing to help
The End of Gatekeeping 71evenintheabsenceofcontractualobligationstodoso.Thisphenomenon
is entirely absent from today’s markets. Our finding may shed light on
the evolution of contagion over the long run.
VI. Turnover and Reputation
Another bit of evidence can be garnered by looking at turnover. The ten-
dency (previously identified) of underwriters in previous eras to band
with issuers should be reflected in some properties of turnover rates.
Consider this reasoning as applied to what we have called the “past” re-
gime: good issuers benefit from association with prestigious under-
writers because such intermediaries are prepared to support them. Of
course, issuers are charged for this support (we found higher fees then
than now). Good issuers may want to bargain for better terms, yet going
Table 4
Clusters of Contagion








200 bps 20% 200 bps 20% 200 bps 20% 200 bps 20%
Sharp changes
(% of observations) 5.83 4.54 10.5 7.6 0 2.5 13.2 12.9
% months without
sharp changes 37.2 51.1 37.2 45.7 100 90.4 43.2 44.1
Sharp changes in
one country 20.2 26.6 20.2 25.5 0 8.5 30.6 34.2
Sharp changes in
two countries 16.0 11.7 16.0 11.7 0 0 15.3 7.2
Sharp changes in
three or more 26.6 10.6 26.6 8.5 0 1.1 10.8 14.4
Sharp changes in
two or more 42.6 22.3 32.6 20.2 0 1.1 26.1 21.6
Contagion ratio
a 67.8 45.6 67.8 44.2 0 11.1 46.0 38.7
Source: Past: Authors’ computations from Wetenhall (see Flandreau and Flores [2009] for
details). Present: Mauro et al. (2006, 115).
Note: The 14 countries for the past are Argentina (independent Stateof Buenos Aires),Austria,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Guatemala, Kingdom of Naples, Mexico, Peru, Portugal,
Prussia,Russia,andSpain.TheeightcountriesforthepresentareArgentina,Brazil,Bulgaria,
Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, and Venezuela. Because of missing observations, we
may slightly underestimate the extent to which there were sharp changes.
aThe contagion ratio is the proportion of sharp changes in at least two countries to sharp
changes in at least one country.
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 72to lesser underwriters would make investors wary. And since there are,
by definition, few good underwriters, turnover at the top should be
small.(Ifweconsiderthatdroppingbymorethanonenotchintheunder-
writingscalewouldentailreputationalcosts,anyturnovershouldbelim-
ited to switching between the top two firms.) On the other hand, lesser
issuers have an incentive to shop around, because prestigious under-
writers prefer not to deal with them and because the remaining under-
writers are substitutes for one another. As a result, we should expect
more turnover at the bottom. The implication of these remarks is that,
for the “past” period, we should observe a positive correlation between
turnover and spreads at issue, other things being equal.
In contrast, we find the modern market to be very competitive and all
underwritersdoprettymuchthesamething.Heretheimplicationsarethat
(a) average turnover ought to be more substantial (all issuers shop for the
best price) and (b) there should not be any correlation between turnover
and spreads. Thus we have two more testable propositions of our theory.
They are examined in figure 6, which correlates (by country) turnover and
averagespread at issue. The figure also permitsus to locate visuallythe
“average”turnover(between0%and100%).Theperiodschosenarethe
moderneraandalongerchunkoftime(London1877–1914)thaninother
tests. This was done in order to ensure the statistical significance of turn-
over rates in the presence of less frequent market access then than now.
32
The result in figure 6 is striking. First of all, it is obvious that average
turnover has increased tremendously in the modern period. Computa-
tions show an average turnover of 51% for the historical period against
86% for the modern one. Second, we observe a positive association be-
tween turnover and spreads for the historical period. There is no such as-
sociationforthemodernperiod,whichisconsistentwithourpredictions.
VII. The Market for Lemons
The last proposition we examine is as follows: if reduced asymmetries of
information permit large underwriters to escape liability costs, then we
should observe a transformation in the characteristics of the bonds that
are issued today compared to earlier periods. Although safer bonds that
could make it to the market then should still be around now, riskier ones
thathadahardertimeinthepasthavebecomelesspenalizedandshould
now feature more prominently. In other words, in the modern era, a
market for lemons is born.
To document this assertion, table 5 provides basic characteristics of
the population of government securities that made their way to the




Fig. 6. Turnover (%) and spreads (bps): a, now; b, late nineteenth century. Sources:
Authors’ database; see appendix A.
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 74for the securities in the corresponding group and also a conversion
o ft h e s ea m o u n t st o2 0 0 8U . S .d o l l a r s( w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dh t t p : / /
www.measuringworth.com/index.html to convert amounts).
33 We then
report information on maturity and risk. Maturity is the time lag to date
of redemption as stated in the initial issuing documentation or the
press;
34 risk can be measured by looking at either yield premium at issue
or rating at issue. Because rating agencies did not begin assessing sover-
eign debt until after World War I, this measure is available only from the
interwar period onward (see Flandreau et al. 2009).
There are two features that emerge from table 5. The first is the shorter
maturities now than in earlier times. During the nineteenth century, av-
erage maturities lengthened gradually: from 31 years (1818–29), to
33 (1845–76), to 47 (1877–95), and finally to 43 (pre–World War I). At
about the same time (1880–1914), maturities were comparable in Paris
(about 50 years). The interwar period saw a substantial decline of matu-
rities, but they remained longer than 25 years. This contrasts with the re-
cent period, for which average maturities have been halved (New York)
orreducedbyafactorofthree(London).Themodernaveragematurityis
less than 10 years. This reduction in length of maturity has been noted
before, but its significance has not been explained. Theory suggests that
restricting maturity of the debt facilitates control because it gives lenders
a sanction over borrowers (Montiel 2003). Hence one possible interpreta-
tion of the evidence on maturities is that foreign debt is inherently riskier
today than in the past.
The second intriguing fact concerns the evolution of spreads. The
shortening of maturities makes direct comparison of spreads difficult
owingtoupward‐slopingyieldcurves.Broner,Lorenzoni,andSchmukler
(2004) arguethat today’semergingeconomiesemployshort‐termborrow-
ing because of the higher risk premium charged by international capital
markets on long‐term debt. As a result, long‐term debt yield premia that
wouldprevailifcountriesborrowedtodayastheydidinthepastmightbe
higher than what we observe. With this qualification in mind, we see that
average spreads are at least as high today as they were in the past, imply-
ing that counterfactual long‐term rates might be substantially higher.
Spreads declined over the nineteenth century, from 357 and 397 basis
points (1820s and midcentury, respectively) to 275 (1880s) and 215 (pre–
World War I); then they rose again during the twentieth century, standing
at291ininterwarNewYorkandat364forthesamemarketinthemodern
period (the average spread in London is now 288 basis points). Similar
spreads associated with substantially shorter maturities may thus be in-
dicative of riskier debt.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































77Another piece of interesting information is provided by average rat-
ings, which are indicated in table 5 and detailed in figure 7. In order to
enable comparisons across time periods, figure 7 aggregates modern
ratings to match earlier, coarser granularity (see app. C for details on
mapping modern ratings to earlier ones). Figure 7 illustrates the cutoff
between investment grade and speculative grade securities, which was
already recognized in the interwarperiod.
35 Ascan be seen in table 5,the
average rating for foreign debt was above investment grade during the
1920s (averaging A) but is now squarely within speculative grade (with
an average of BB for New York and BB+ for London). In figure 7, we see
that the speculative grade category was extremely narrow during the in-
terwar period, but it is much broader today. In other words, a genuine
liquid market for speculative grade government securities has arisen.
In the language of one Alliance Capital interviewee who described the
modern market, “Underwriters will underwrite anything, for a fee.”
We argue that, in the past, reputable underwriters prevented riskier
securities from reaching the market because of brand concerns.
VIII. Regime Change
This paper has outlined the contours of two successive certification re-
gimes: the old one, which rested on underwriters’ signals, and the new
one, in which underwriters have outsourced the certification service
to rating agencies. One pending question is why this transformation
occurred: Why was certification outsourced to rating agencies? In this
Fig. 7. Percent investment grade and speculative grade securities (interwar period and
now). Sources: Authors’ database; see appendices A and C.
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 78section we review a number of arguments that may explain why under-
writers shed their earlier role as gatekeepers of the quality of interna-
tional government securities.
A natural explanation that comes to mind is progress in information
technology. The insider knowledge of the “Rothschild era”—as well as
the superior technology provided by pigeons, reliable correspondents,
and so forth—would become less important in today’s world, when in-
formation can race across continents at nearly the speed of light. Inves-
tors now learn about market prices in real time. Moreover, governments
today are more open and transparent and are also more uniform in re-
porting data.Thesefactors musthaveplayeda role, yet they seemto lose
significance in the face of the abruptness with which the regime change
occurred. After all, there were radical changes in information technology
thatoccurredbetweenthe1820sandthe1920s.Newsthatoncetookdays
or even weeks to reach leading markets became available in seconds.
Although seconds have been sliced tof r a c t i o n so fas e c o n ds i n c et h e
1920s,themarginalchangeissmaller.Itisthereforeunclear,iftechnology
iswhatmattersmost,whytheinterwarperiodwassomuchliketheearly
nineteenth century (itself similar to the eighteenth century) but so differ-
ent from the modern era.
Anothercounterargumenttothetechnology‐basedexplanationisthat,
once a signaling regime of the kind that prevailed in the past is in place
and performs well, there are no reasons to replace it: incumbents see no
advantage in changing the status quo, and outsiders are unable to do so.
In other words, we expect to see a fair amount of persistence in certifica-
tion regimes, quite apart from the strict availability of information. Sup-
porting this conjecture, we note the persistent leadership of the House of
Rothschild in the nineteenth century (it could be displaced only when
the market moved to New York, where Rothschild had no presence).
Its leadership continued even as carrier pigeons were replaced by tele-
graph and as word of mouth was replaced by The Economist’s Investors’
Monthly Manual. Similarly, Moody’s, Standard Statistics, Poor’s, and
Fitch, all of which began rating sovereigns during the interwar period,
coexisted with the “JP Morgan” certification regime identified previously.
Still, they were unable to displace this regime. During the 1931–32 U.S.
SenatehearingsbeforetheCommittee onFinance,nobodyfromtherating
agencies was asked to testify, but bankers, economists, and government
statisticianswere.Whendiscussioncenteredonthemeasurementof“over-
indebtedness,” the opinions of Moody’s were not sought. In other words,
even when new vehicles are available to provide information, investors
do not necessarily use them or coordinate the information from them.
The End of Gatekeeping 79Followingthislineofreasoning,apossibilitywebelieveworthyofcon-
sideration is that, at the time when the current regime was put in place,
underwriterscould nolonger beconsideredcrediblecertifiers.Notethat,
between the collapse of the 1930s and the securitization of the 1980s
(Brady bonds), there were about 50 years during which the international
governmentdebtmarketwasasleepingbeauty.Theaccountswehaveof
the conditions under which this market was reawakened do suggest that
certification by underwriters was not an option. A senior manager from
Moody’s, sharing his memories of the 1980s, suggested that sovereign
ratingshadtobereinventedinarushbecausetheywerecriticalforbook-
ing and marketing purposes. We interpret this as suggesting that, since
the Brady bonds were designed to off‐load defaulted debts from the
balance sheets of international banks, the very same banks that had al-
readymadebadchoicescouldhardlybecrediblecertifiersofgovernment
securities. Hence some other certification instrument had to be conceived.
Asaresult,whentheinternationalgovernmentdebtmarketwokeup,the
first thing she saw was a rating agency, and she immediately fell in love
with it. (Though, as with all couples, there would be crises later on.)
The investment banks that became involved in the new market prob-
ablywelcomedthetransformation(theyincludedreincarnationsofinter-
war New York leaders such as JP Morgan or National City Bank). Fees
were now smaller, of course, but liability risk was also reduced. Rating
agencieswouldbethenewlightningrodforaccusationsoffinancialmal-
practice.Thebanks,althoughundoubtedlyinformed,wouldnowbeable
to show to unhappy customers the grades given by (possibly less in-
formed) rating agencies. Academic economists have lent support to this
interpretation, blaming the agencies (Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz 1999; Reisen
and Von Maltzan 1999). Against the reduction of fees stood reduced
maturities that increased the frequency of market access events, which
increased revenues. In addition, the emergence of a new market for lem-
ons created new opportunities by increasing the total amount to be un-
derwritten. The net effect may have depended on the particulars of each
specific bank, but we can safely suppose that, if there were profits to be
made by reverting to the old regime (i.e., by limiting investment to select
securities as a signal of one’s worth), then the industry would have al-
ready figured it out.
Otherfactorsthatmayhavepushedinthesamedirectionincludeques-
tions of ownership and control in investment banks. Both British‐style
merchant banks and U.S.‐style investment banks were formerly private
institutions,andownersofthecapitalkeptacloseeyeonthedealmakers
(or originators) because they were the same. But modern investment
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 80banks are listed companies and thus may have a shorter time horizon.
The agency problems created by the distribution of bonuses to invest-
mentbankershavenaturallyreinforcedtheneedforexternalcertification
services. This explains why rating agencies have now become part of the
regulatory and certification infrastructure, a role they did not play in
more distant times.
36 In this context, the rise of the use of ratings and
thechangeofprivateinvestmentbanksintolistedcompaniesarecomple-
mentarytransformations.Itremainstobeseenwhetherwearesaferwith
underwriting and certification made by the same agent or instead split
across various financial intermediaries.
IX. Conclusion
Inanutshell,wefindasfollows.Inearlierperiods,investmentbankspro-
vided their customers at both ends (lenders and borrowers) with a vast
array of services; banks acted as broker, certifier, and lender of last resort
when issues failed. Today, certification is mostly provided by rating
agencies, and so underwriting banks perform the more limited function
of“makingthemarket”fortheissuinggovernment.Wedemonstratethat
a result of this transformation is considerably lower fees (as a share of
the amount issued) now than in the past. A further implication is that
government debt today is by construction more risky and volatile than
it was in the past. Moreover, this debt is certified by agents who do not
have direct access to the flow of soft information normally obtained
through the underwriting and banking relationship. Instead, these
agents must rely on published information only. Should trouble come,
rating agencies have no means to help and no privileged information.
Underwriters have no reason to provide support, because they have
escaped liability by transferring certification duties to the rating agen-
cies. By contrast, in the past, a bank as both issuer and certifier saw the
wisdom of not jeopardizing its reputation and was often willing to serve
as a lender of last resort.
Although this evolution may have beneficial aspects (e.g., it enables
high‐risk countries to borrow when before they were “rationed out”),
we speculate that it has engendered new risks. First, it may have weak-
ened market discipline. Since underwriters have been able to pass on to
others the liability of making wrong choices, they have also softened
borrowing governments’ incentives to make adjustments when needed.
Second,thedegreetowhichtheincreasedriskthatisbuiltintothesystem
remains manageable hinges critically on the ability of investors to diver-
sify. Yet no one has demonstrated that diversification is actually feasible
The End of Gatekeeping 81in the face of large, correlated supply shocks. It is thus our contention
that future crises will be different and exhibit more dangerous features
than previous episodes.
In a recent piece of professional self‐introspection, Acemoglu (2009,
2–3) writes about one of the several notions he felt had been destroyed
by the subprime crisis: “our logic and models suggested that even if we
couldnottrustindividuals,particularlywheninformationwasimperfect
and regulation lacklustre, we could trust the long‐lived large firms—
companies such as the Enron’s, the Bear Stearn’s, the Merrill Lynch’s,
and the Lehman Brothers’so ft h i sw o r l d —to monitor themselves and
their own because they had accumulated sufficient reputation capital.
Our faith in long‐lived large organisations was shaken but still standing
aftertheaccountingscandalsinEnronandothergiantsoftheearly2000s.
It may now have suffered the death blow.” This paper sheds light on
why such faith was disappointed: we assumed, incorrectly, that the




Data on the characteristics of financial instruments were collected using
traditional London sources such as Fortune’s Epitome, the Reports of Cor-
poration of Foreign Bondholders, Burdett’s Stock Market Official Intelli-
gence, London Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, and the financial
press (The Economist and its supplement, the Investors’ Monthly Manual,
and The Times). For Paris, we relied on the Annuaire Officiel des Agents de
Change (1882–1914).
37 F o rN e wY o r k ,w eh a v er e l i e do nt h eM o o d y ’s
manuals, Fitch Bond Books, and Poor’s Volumes, as well as on the U.S.
S e n a t eC o m m i t t e eo nF i n a n c eH e a r i n g so nt h eS a l eo fF o r e i g nB o n d s
published 1932 (U.S. Congress 1932). Data on defaults are obtained from
these sources.
Modern Period
The now period (1993–2007) is covered using DCM Analytics, the fixed
incomeproductofDealogic(globalcoverageofthedebtcapitalmarkets),
an investorsand financialintermediaries service.It is described in Nieto‐
Parra (2009). For defaults, we combined a data set for sovereign default
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 82on foreign currency debt provided by Moody’s Foreign and American
Government Securities and a useful database from Sturzenegger and




Apart from occasional mentions in the contemporary press or in second-
ary sources indicated in sources for tables, material on fees does not exist
for the early periods. It was entirely constructed from archives. The pa-
tienceofarchivistsfromRothschild,ING‐Baring(BaringBrothers),HSBC
(Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation), the Guildhall Library
(Hambro and London Stock Exchange Archive), BNP‐Paribas (Banque
de Paris et des Pays‐Bas), Crédit Agricole (Crédit Lyonnais), and the
Centre d’Archives du Monde du Travail (Rothschild frères, Banque Im-
périale Ottomane) is gratefully acknowledged for they allowed us to
open literally hundreds of boxes in search for original contracts.
Regarding the interwar period, fees have been previously published
by Kuczynski (1932) and Lewis (1938). Both have worked with, and
somewhatinterpreted,theevidenceinthefour‐volumeU.S.SenateCom-
mittee on Finance Hearings on the Sale of Foreign Bonds. We went back
to this source. Finally, fees for modern times are available in Dealogic’s
Bondware.
Bond Prices
Bond price series used in Section V are the same as in Flandreau and
Flores (2009). They provide a detailed description of the material.
Appendix B
Spreads and Fees
In this appendix, we discuss factors that determine the fee collected by
an underwriter in the event of full underwriting. Our goal is to demon-
strate that fees are an increasing function of risk and thus, since spreads
measure risk, of spreads. For this purpose, we consider a government
facing an underwriting industry that is made of competitive, risk‐
neutral, firms. We call p the “shadow” price that would be expected
t op r e v a i lo nt h ei s s u ed a t ei ft h ei s s u ew a st a k i n gp l a c ed i r e c t l yo n
the market. The shadow price may be thought of as an indicator of
The End of Gatekeeping 83liquidity. An adverse liquidity shock on the day of the issue would
force the government to sell the bond at a discount, whereas a favorable
one would yield a premium. Calling u a random shock with a uniform
distribution [−a, a] such that EðuÞ¼0 (with 0 ≤ a ≤1), we write without
loss of generality,
p ¼ 1 þ u:
The problem at hand is to determine, given the issue price pE,t h e
price at which the underwriting syndicate purchases the bond from
the government, or pA ¼ pAðpE;aÞ. Suppose that at the date of the issue
the shadow price is above the issue price. Then investors will want to
subscribe to the bond, and the issue is entirely sold to the market. The
bank having purchased the bond from the government at pA resells it
to the public at pE and makes a gain of pE   pA per share. If by contrast
the shadow price is below the issue price, nobody will want to purchase
the bond and the bank makes either a gain or a loss, depending on the
sign of p   pA. Because of the risk of losing money if the issue turns
awry, the bank will accept to buy the bond from the government only
at a price that is sufficiently low so that the gains in the favorable states
of nature compensate the losses incurred in unfavorable ones.
39
In this setting, two critical assumptions help determine pA. First, risk
neutrality ensures that a bank is happy with a compensation that is just
equal to the average loss she expects to make in unfavorable states of
nature. Second, the competitive structure of the industry ensures that
she will not ask for a higher compensation than the one that offsets its
expected losses (otherwise the government will turn to another bank).
As implied from what we already stated, the bank will gain pE   pA
if u≥ pE   1 and will gain/lose pi   pi
A ¼ 1 þ ui   pi
A if  a≤ u < pE   1.
The expected gain G from underwriting the bond issue is
G ¼ð pi
E   pi
AÞ 
 
ai  ð pi









ð1 þ ui   pi
AÞdui:
The zero profit condition tying pE and pA together, given a, is thus
ðpE pAÞ ða   pE þ 1Þþ1
2  ½ ð pE   1Þ
2   a2 þ½ ð 1   pAÞ ð pE   1 þ aÞ  ¼ 0:
This equation determines pA as an implicit function of pE. In a more
general approach, it would be interesting to treat pE as endogenous as
well and derive both prices as model solutions. However, since the basic
property considered here obtains for any pE, it is just as good to focus on
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 84thedeterminationofpA only.Forsimplicity,therefore,andinlinewiththe
discussion above, we assume that the underwriting syndicate marks the
issue to market and sets the issue price at the expected shadow price on
the day of the issue. Therefore,
pi
E ¼ 1:
Substituting this in the previous equation, we then get simply
pi
A ¼ 1  
ai
4
and the underwriting fee
pi





This shows that the larger the variance of the expected liquidity
shock on the market for bond i (or identically the more volatile the price
of bond i), the larger the “haircut” that a competitive risk‐neutral bank
will require in order to underwrite the issue of that bond. If volatility is
maximum (ai ¼ 1), banks accept government bonds only at 75% of their
issue price. By contrast, if there is no volatility (ai ¼ 0), banks take the
bonds from the government at the very price at which they resell them
to the public and the underwriting fee is zero. The important point here
is that the fee charged for full underwriting must be an increasing func-
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1. The most significant contributions include Bordo and Murshid (2000), Kaminsky and
Reinhart (2000), Mauro et al. (2002, 2006), Neal and Weidenmier (2002), Kaminsky, Reinhart,
and Végh (2003), and Flandreau and Flores (2009).
2. See also Winkler (1933) and Flandreau, Gaillard, and Packer (2009) for the emergence
of ratings in the interwar period.
3. See Flandreau, Le Cacheux, and Zumer (1998) for an early contribution. Subsequent
works include Flandreau and Zumer (2004) and Mauro et al. (2006).
4. See Bordo, Edelstein, and Rockoff (1999) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004) fordissent-
ing views.
5. See Flandreau and Zumer (2004) for the late nineteenth century and Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) for longer time periods.
6. See Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Grigorian (2003), Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris
(2004), and Fostel and Kaminsky (2007). Other papers relate to (mostly descriptive) aspects



















Source: Authors, from Moody’s manuals.
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 867. “Original sin” refers to the observed tendency to denominate external debt in foreign
currency (see Eichengreen and Hausman 2005). For historical aspects of the matter, see
Flandreau and Sussman (2005).
8. See Eichengreen and Mody (2000), Becker, Richards, and Thaicharoen (2003), and
Gugiatti and Richards (2003) for different perspectives.
9. Jenks (1927), Landes (1958), and Gille (1965, 1967) provide classic accounts.
10. See Lewis (1938). Roberts (1992) describes how certain London houses opened shops
in New York to remain in the game.
11. We leave out the experience with syndicated lending, which was very different from
present and earlier arrangements since it served to allocate bank debt and thus differs rad-
ically from the “originate and distribute” setup. In particular, this market involved interna-
tional financial institutions that were all “informed” and kept the credits on their books.
12. Appendix A gives a description of data sources.
13. More precisely, we focus on securities that are taken into account for league table
purposes. See Bloomberg Markets (2006).
14. See Mauro et al. (2006) for a study that proceeds in this spirit.
15. See, e.g., Goldfajn and Valdes (1997), Berg and Pattillo (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini (1998), Demirgüç‐Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 1999), Kaminsky (1998), Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999), and Goldstein, Reinhart, and Kaminsky (2000). In a recent addition to
this literature, Nieto‐Parra (2009) shows that fees paid to underwriting banks have an ex-
planatory power for predicting sovereign crises.
16. For empirical evidence on this argument, which has often been mentioned (see, e.g.,
Calvo 1998), see Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003).
17. A related question was considered by Mintz (1951), who emphasized heterogeneity
in default rates during the interwar period.
18. Defaults reached close to 40% in the three episodes. They are close to 10% for the
modern era. Computations by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest that the selected
episodes were the most violent in history.
19. Given the sheer difference in the size of the populations (the number of observations
for 1820 is 23; for the 1850s–70s, 180; for the 1920s, 124; and for now, 1,442), straight com-
parison of chi‐square is not adequate. Cramér’s V controls for that bydividing by the num-
ber of observations and tests the strength of the association between the defaults and
intermediaries. For 1820, Cramér’s Vequals .93; for the 1850s–70s, .73; and for the 1920s,
.69.Thesenumbers(above.7)areconventionallyinterpretedasrevealingstrongassociation
(herebetweendefaultandunderwriters).Bycontrast,wefindthattheVfornowequals.20.
A value between zero and .25 is usually interpreted as indicating a nonexistent to weak
association.
20. We are aware that default does not mean irrecoverable capital losses as previous re-
searchhasdemonstrated.Yetitprovidesasimple,straightforwardwaytocapturethenum-
ber of “problem cases” and is thus a valid indicator of performance.
21. For instance, JP Morgan told us that “everything is best efforts, rarely a firm commit-
ment. Best efforts is the standard.” Moreover, according to Lehman Bros., “banks would
never put up capital to buy a whole deal. You are not really paid to take that risk today …
hence best efforts being the main vehicle for underwriting, not firm underwriting.”
22. The limited role of the bank in the sale on commission is described in the following
way by White (of Barings) examined by the Select Committee:“Q 64: What is it that you do
forthat;whatisityouareboundto doforthatcommission?—Weareboundto makeallthe
arrangementsforissuingtheloan.Q65:Whatsortofarrangements;supposetheagreement
made, what do you do?—We examine all the documents, and prepare the prospectus, and
invite subscriptions for the loan; then we issue scrip for the loan, then receive the proceeds
generally by various instalments [sic]; and when all this is completed we receive the bonds




24. The committee was concerned with the way information about underwriters of the
loan would be conveyed to the market. “Will you tell me, please, would that prospectus
show the contractors for the loan; assuming Messrs. Baring to have contracted with the
Russian government, or any other Government, would their name appear as contractors
The End of Gatekeeping 87upon the prospectus?—Yes. But in many cases loans are issued simply by the firm in
London as agents for the Government and not as contractors for the loan. Most generally
loansareissuedbythefirminLondonasagentsfortheGovernment”(GreatBritain.House
of Commons 1875, 2). At a later stage of the interview White added that he knew of only
“one instance of a loan which has come under [his] control which was not issued on
commission.”
25. Specifically, we have tried to identify the charges that werepaid in the cases in which
the alternative system was chosen. While we have no evidence of a modern contract with
full underwriting, there are cases of best‐effort contracts in the past. First we have the
Barings contracts already alluded to. Next we have contracts that coincide with “conver-
sions” (whereby debts were swapped against new ones with lower yields). Underwriters
bore no substantial risk (although unhappy investors could in principle ask for a refund)
but had to prepare the market, talk to investors, explain the particulars of the new bond,
etc.,somewhatlikewhatunderwritersdounder“bestefforts.”Anotherwaytomeasurethe
value of distribution is to split when this is feasible the distribution (or placement) fee from
the underwriting fee.
26. Interpreting the underwriting service for the issuer as an insurance premium, app. B
shows that under firm commitment contracts, fees are an increasing function of spreads.
27. Notethatrecentresearchprovidesconflictingresultsonthemodernrelationbetween
fees and yields. Amira (2004) finds such an association for (corporate) Eurobonds. Nieto‐
Parra (2009) reports weak evidence of this correlation for modern emerging market sover-
eign debt.
28. ConsiderthefollowingexcerptfromtheprospectusofaBrazilianbond(10.5%Global
Bonds Due 2014) issued in July 2004: “No assurance can be given as to the liquidity of the
tradingmarketfortheglobalbonds.”Someintervieweesreportedthatthisserviceisrelated
to the fee paid to the underwriter and to the underwriter’s willingness to acquire a reputa-
tion as a good supporter, increasing the likelihood of securing future contracts.
29. This is unlike the underwriting services occasionally provided to emerging govern-
ment bonds by multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank or the Andean Develop-
ment Corporation, which do include commitments.
30. Membersof syndicates,underwriters,andbrokers weresaidto engageinthepromo-
tion of similar bonds by forward market operations in order to whet the appetite of inves-
tors. This practice, called “market rigging,” has often been frowned on (Great Britain.
House of Commons 1875; Lysis 1908; Jenks 1927, 276–78; Benston 1990).
31. See White’s testimony before the Select Committee (Great Britain. House of Com-
mons 1875, 1 ff). This allegation does not stand against powerful evidence from Barings’
own archive (Ziegler 1988; Flores 2004).
32. Turnover is measured as the sum of underwriter switches divided by the number of
issues. Where there are multiple underwriters, if any one of the underwriters from the pre-
viousissueisamongtheunderwritersforthecurrentissue,wedonotconsiderthiseventas
a switch. Because (as the next section will show) countries used to access markets with
longer‐termsecuritiesthantodayandthuslessfrequently,theinterwarperiodwithitsshort
boom and bust record is not a good benchmark, and we have preferred using the last two
periods of the nineteenth century (London market), for which a long track record(and thus
reliable turnover rates) can be constructed (1877–1914).
33. Conversions arebased on the CPI.Theyear used is midperiodexceptfor the first era,
for which 1830 was chosen. Conversions were performed using the “measuring worth”
facility provided on http://eh.net/, the Economic History Association official Web site.
The site provides conversions for both sterling and U.S. dollars. French francs were first
converted to dollars at the (fixed) exchange rate that prevailed at the time (gold standard).
34. Actual redemption could be shorter, and as we already discussed, it was standard
practice for loan contracts to contain covenants permitting reimbursement or conversion
before maturity.
35. In the interwar period, the cutoff was Baa/Ba. Today it is Baa3/Ba1 (Moody’s). See
Flandreau et al. (2009).
36. See Flandreau et al. (2009) for historical details. The recent past has seen rating agen-
cies becoming important agents in new bond offerings. While their participation is not
strictly needed in a legal sense, domestic or international prudential regulation, which do
relyon ratingsandplace limits onthe purchase of unratedsecurities,makethem necessary.
Flandreau, Flores, Gaillard, and Nieto‐Parra 88Forinstance,theBaselIIregulatoryframeworkpenalizesunratedsecurities(BaselCommit-
tee on Banking Supervision 2005).
37. Itcoverssecuritiessoldintheofficialmarket,wheremostgovernmentsecuritieswere
transacted.
38. The database is available at http://profesores.utdt.edu/~fsturzen/Publications.htm.
To make sure that we were not losing any of the many bonds defaulted on by Argentina in
2001 (Porzecanski 2005), we also considered a database provided by the Ministry of Finance
of Argentina (http://www.mecon.gov.ar/finanzas/download/anexo_comunicado_prensa
.pdf) as well as material provided by the Argentine Bond Restructuring Agency (http://
www.hypovereinsbank.de/media/pdf/Wertpapierliste.pdf).
39. For simplicity, we considerthata shadowpriceexactlyequalto theissue price means
a success. In practice, transaction costs (agents have to switch from identical assets to pur-
chase the new one) imply that the issue will succeed only if the issue price is marginally
below the shadow price so that investors are compensated for the expenses they face in
reallocating portfolios.
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